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Torture – The Case for Dirty Harry and against Alan Dershowitz 
 
Can torture be morally justified? I shall criticise arguments that have been ad-
duced against torture and demonstrate that torture can be justified more easily 
than most philosophers dealing with the question are prepared to admit. It can be 
justified not only in ticking nuclear bomb cases but also in less spectacular tick-
ing bomb cases and even in the so-called Dirty Harry cases. There is no morally 
relevant difference between self-defensive killing of a culpable aggressor and 
torturing someone who is culpable of a deadly threat that can be averted only by 
torturing him. Nevertheless, I shall argue that torture should not be institutional-
ised, for example by torture warrants. 
 
What is so bad about torturing people, anyway? People also kill people. Soldiers 
kill people, policemen kill people, doctors kill people, executioners kill people 
and ordinary people kill people. Some of these killings are justified. So why 
shouldn’t it be justified in some cases to torture people? After all, being killed 
seems to be worse than being tortured. Even most of the tortured people seem to 
see it this way; otherwise they would kill themselves in order to escape further 
torture (yes, some do, but they are only few). So, if killing is sometimes justified, 
torture too must sometimes be justified. 
Henry Shue thinks that this is a weak argument. Referring in particular to 
the legitimate killing of people in war, he states: 
Even if one grants that killing someone in combat is doing him or her a greater harm than tortur-
ing him or her..., it by no means follows that there could not be a justification for the greater 
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harm that was not applicable to the lesser harm. Specifically, it would matter if some killing 
could satisfy other moral constraints (besides the constraint of minimizing harm) which no tor-
ture could satisfy.1 
The moral constraint he has in mind is the prohibition of assaults upon the de-
fenceless. However, it can be doubted whether this is a valid constraint at all. 
Shue’s idea that it is valid is based on the fact that one “of the most basic princi-
ples for the conduct of war (ius in bello) rests on the distinction between com-
batants and noncombatants and requires that insofar as possible, violence not be 
directed at noncombatants”.2 One fundamental function of this distinction, ac-
cording to Shue,  
is to try to make a terrible combat fair. ... No doubt, the opportunities may not have been any-
where near equal–it would be impossible to restrict wars to equally matched opponents. But at 
least none of the parties to the combat were defenseless.3 
To be sure, Shue admits that this “invokes a simplified, if not romanticized, por-
trait of warfare”, but he explains that 
the point now is not to attack or defend the efficacy of the principle of warfare that combat is 
more acceptable morally if restricted to official combatants, but to notice one of its moral bases, 
which, I am suggesting, is that it allows for a “fair fight” by means of protecting the utterly de-
fenseless from assault.4 
It is true that the fact that the prohibition of assaults upon the defenceless is not 
always obeyed in war does not pose any problem for Shue’s argument. What 
does pose a problem, however, is that this principle is no ius in bello principle at 
all, and it does not, pace Shue, underlie the principled distinction between com-
batants and non-combatants.5 This can be seen quite easily. Suppose an army 
that possesses superior artillery advances upon the enemy trenches. It has two 
options. It can shell the enemy trenches from a safe distance with artillery fire. 
The enemy would be entirely defenceless against such an attack; his weapons do 
not have the range for fighting back.6 (This was pretty much the situation in the 
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first and the second Iraq wars.)  Or it can advance without shelling the enemy 
first. Here the enemy would be able to fire upon the advancing troops and to in-
flict heavy casualties. The point now is that there is simply no article in the laws 
of war (and no constraint in just war theory, for that matter) that would rule out 
the first option as such. Of course, if the objectives of the war could be achieved 
without shelling the enemy in its death-trap trenches and without inflicting 
higher casualties on one’s own forces, this alternative course of action would 
have to be adopted. But the reason for this is the principle of proportionality.7 An 
alleged principle of the immunity of the defenceless plays no role here. 
To be sure, I do not deny that there is something fishy about attacking the de-
fenceless. What is fishy about it might be captured very well in this passage:  
The pilot of a fighter-bomber or the crew of a man-of-war from which the Tomahawk rockets are 
launched are beyond the reach of the enemy’s weapons. War has lost all features of the classical 
duel situation here and has approached, to put it cynically, certain forms of pest control.8 
Judged from a traditional warrior’s code of honour, a code that emphasises, 
among other things, courage, there is nothing honourable in killing off defence-
less enemies (whether it is therefore already dishonourable is yet another ques-
tion). But honour and morality are not the same, and honour and the laws of war 
are not either. In short, the prohibition of assaults upon the defenceless is neither 
an explicit nor an implicit principle of the laws of war or of just war theory.  
Moreover, it is not even clear what should be unfair about killing the defence-
less in war in the first place. If the rules of war allowed both sides to kill, for 
example, defenceless prisoners of war, where is the unfairness? Both sides are in 
the same situation. And if the laws of war allowed the torture of POWs, the same 
would be true. Invoking principles of fairness does not deliver an argument 
against either of the two practices. 
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David Sussman has recently attempted to give another explanation of why tor-
ture, allegedly, “bears an especially high burden of justification, greater in de-
gree and different in kind from even that of killing”.9 However, he also cautions 
that this “is not to say that when torture is wrong, it is worse that [sic] wrongful 
acts of maiming and killing” or that “it is more important for us to prevent tor-
ture than it is to prevent murder, or that torturers should be condemned or pun-
ished more severely than murderers. The moral differences between torture, kill-
ing, and maiming may not always make a difference in such third-personal con-
texts.”10 But why, then, should torture bear an “especially high burden of justifi-
cation”? Does it bear such a higher burden only in second-person or first-person 
contexts? But what is that supposed to mean? That whereas one does not need a 
better justification for allowing others to torture or for not condemning torturers 
than for allowing others to kill or for not condemning killers, one does need a 
better justification for torturing (and perhaps also for risking being tortured) than 
for killing?  Sussman argues that  
torture forces its victim into the position of colluding against himself through his own affects and 
emotions, so that he experiences himself as simultaneously powerless and yet actively complicit 
in his own violation. So construed, torture turns out to be not just an extreme form of cruelty, but 
the pre-eminent instance of a kind of forced self-betrayal, more akin to rape than other kinds of 
violence characteristic of warfare or police action.11 
He elaborates: 
What the torturer does is to take his victim’s pain, and through it his victim’s body, and make it 
begin to express the torturer’s will.12 
... Torture does not merely insult or damage its victim’s agency, but rather turns such agency 
against itself, forcing the victim to experience herself as helpless yet complicit in her own viola-
tion. This is not just an assault on or violation of the victim’s autonomy but also a perversion of it, 
a kind of systematic mockery of the basic moral relations that an individual bears both to others 
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and to herself. Perhaps this is why torture seems qualitatively worse than other forms of brutality 
or cruelty.13 
But all this can hardly explain the alleged difference between “third-personal” 
and other contexts. In fact, it would seem rather natural to assume that, if torture 
isn’t worse than killing from a third-person perspective, it isn’t so from a second- 
or first-person perspective either. If Sussman sees this differently, the high bur-
den of justification, it appears, would be on him. 
Conversely, assume a dictator confronts prisoner A with the following 
choice – to either kill one of ten prisoners or to torture one of them for two hours 
(all these prisoners are innocent and have no special relation to the first pris-
oner).14 If A refuses to choose and to act on his choice, all ten prisoners will be 
killed. If he decided to choose (and it seems plain to me that he is justified in 
choosing even though he may not be obliged to do so), should the prisoner facing 
the choice rather kill one prisoner than torture one of them for two hours? This is 
to be strongly doubted. On the other hand, there can hardly be any doubt that the 
ten prisoners would prefer him to opt for torture if he asked them what to do – to 
refuse to choose, to choose to kill or to choose to torture. He is not permitted to 
ask them (if he did, all ten prisoners would be killed). However, in light of the 
fact that it is reasonable to assume that they would prefer two hours of torture to 
being killed for good, he should honour that preference if he decides to choose. It 
seems, then, that torture is easier to justify than killing even from a first-person 
perspective. 
Moreover, the feature that in Sussman’s eyes makes torture so bad is by no 
means unique to torture. We find it, in fact, even in armed robbery. If a robber 
points a gun at a victim and threatens to kill him if the victim does not give his 
money to the robber, the robber, if successful, also turns the victim’s agency 
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against the victim himself. He makes the victim’s fear express his, the robber’s, 
will; and the victim, in handing over the money for fear of death, is “complicit” 
in his own violation.  
It is important to note here that the victim will also normally not react to the 
threat with a utility/risk-calculation, i.e. with rational deliberation. If, especially 
at night in a dark alley, one has a gun pointed at one’s head and hears: “Give me 
your f... money or I’ll f... kill you”, one will hardly engage in deliberations of 
this kind: “The probability, that his threat is meant seriously, lies around x; my 
options to defend myself or to escape are this and that, with this and that prob-
ability of success; if, on the other hand, I give him the money, this will cost me 
certainly y money units, which in turn leads with probability z to my not being 
able to pay in time for this and that thing, which in turn ... and therefore I will ...” 
Rather, many people threatened with deadly violence will think: “Oh my God, he 
wants to shoot me, he wants to shoot me ... I’ll give him the money!” Thus, the 
sudden death threat and the perceived time pressure will in most cases severely 
disturb the ability to deliberate rationally if they do not completely undermine it. 
In short, fear may overwhelm one as pain overwhelms the victim of torture. 
There may be differences of degree but no qualitative ones. Besides, at least 
some forms of torture will undermine the ability of some torture victims to think 
rationally less than some forms of death threat would of some threatened people.     
Thus, Sussman is not able to show that there is a higher burden of justification 
on torture than on killing. Conversely, thought experiments like those of the ten 
prisoners strongly suggest that it is the other way around. 
Of course, it is true that emotional reactions to displays of torture, for exam-
ple in movies, are much stronger than those to displays of killing. And I suspect 
that much of the conviction that torture is somehow more terrible than death is 
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sustained by these immediate emotional reactions. In fact, however, little of 
moral relevance follows from them. After all, the emotional reactions to scenes 
involving large amounts of faeces or cockroaches, for example, are mostly also 
stronger than to scenes involving killing, at least when it is a quick killing. When 
the killing is prolonged the reactions are stronger, but they are then prompted by 
the displayed suffering – sometimes simply in the form of fear – not by the im-
pending death itself. The point is that we simply cannot empathise with the dead. 
There is nothing we can empathise with. We do not know how it is to be dead, 
and there is certainly no possibility to feel dead (in any non-metaphorical sense). 
We do know, however, what it is to feel pain. Therefore, if we see how pain is 
inflicted on another person, we can feel quite literally com-passion. There is no 
such compassion possible with the dead (we can only feel sorry for them, but 
that is a completely different and far less intense feeling). In other words, our 
emotional reactions to displays of torture or killing respectively are distorted by 
certain limits of empathy. What are not distorted are our emotional reactions to 
the prospect of our own death. Most of us fear it more than torture (that is limited 
in time). Whether killing is worse than torturing, then, should be measured 
against the preferences of people facing the alternatives of torture (over a certain 
limited time) and death – most prefer torture. To measure it against emotional 
reactions to displays of torture would by way of extension also mean that it is 
better to shoot someone dead than to push him into a bathtub filled with cock-
roaches. But such an implication obviously reduces the premise to absurdity. 
 Thus, it seems the argument in defence of torture given at the beginning is 
not such a weak one after all. We can now slightly rephrase it in the light of our 
findings: If it is permissible to kill a defenceless enemy combatant in order to 
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avoid own casualties, why should it not be permissible to torture a defenceless 
terrorist in order to avoid own casualties? 
One might try to answer this by saying that the enemy soldiers in my example 
may be defenceless in the situation in which they are shelled or attacked with 
missiles, but that they still pose a threat – they threaten our advancing troops, 
which is precisely the reason why we take them out by artillery or rockets. The 
detained terrorist, on the other hand, does not pose a threat any more. For what 
can he do? 
Sanford Levinson states that “the defender of torture would dispute the prem-
ise that the captured prisoner is no longer a threat, at least if the prisoner pos-
sesses important information about the future conduct of his fellow terrorists.”15 
The case of the defender of torture can be made much stronger, however, if we 
take the infamous ticking bomb case. The terrorist has somewhere hidden a 
bomb which will, if it goes off, kill a high number of innocents (maybe it is even 
a nuclear bomb that would destroy one of the ten biggest cities in the world). He 
does not want to say where it is. Would it not be justified to torture him in order 
to make him disclose the vital information and find the bomb in time to disable it? 
Some might be inclined to argue that withholding vital information (i.e. an 
omission) couldn’t reasonably be described as a threat. Perhaps, perhaps not. 
However, people culpably posing a threat and aggressors are not the only per-
sons that can be legitimately killed. For it seems, as Phillip Montague has 
pointed out, that, in cases in which one cannot save oneself from the negative 
consequences of another person’s acts in any other way than by diverting or in-
flicting them on this person, one is justified in doing so. Montague states the 
following conditions for this: 
 8
(i) individuals X1 ... Xn are situated so that harm will unavoidably befall some but not all of them; 
(ii) that they are so situated is the fault of some but not all members of the group; (iii) the nature 
of the harm is independent of the individuals who are harmed; (iv) Y, who is not necessarily 
included in X1 ... Xn is in a position to determine who will be harmed.16 
The inflicting of harm (for example in the form of an attack or in the form of 
torture) on a certain person, thus, is not legitimised here by a present aggression 
but by the person’s culpably causing the threat of harm. This cause can lie in the 
past. Montague adduces the example of a doctor who wishes for the death of a 
cardiac patient and therefore swallows the pacemaker the patient needs. The only 
chance to get the pacemaker quickly enough to save the patient’s life is to per-
form a hasty operation on the doctor, which, however, would be fatal to him. 
Hence, one faces here a situation in which either the innocent patient or the mali-
cious doctor has to die. However, if one of the two has to die anyway and one 
has to decide who it is going to be, then one clearly should, says Montague, de-
cide against the person who has culpably brought about this situation. That 
seems to be a pretty reasonable stance, and I agree with him. The application to 
the case of the terrorist who has hidden a bomb to kill innocents is obvious. 
It even suffices when the bomb would kill only one innocent. We do not have 
to assume a ticking nuclear bomb, killing thousands or even millions. Consider 
the Dirty Harry case. In the Don Siegel movie Dirty Harry someone kidnaps a 
female child and puts her in a place where she will suffocate if not rescued in 
time. There is not much time left, according to the very claims of the kidnapper. 
The police officer Harry (Clint Eastwood) is to deliver the ransom to the kidnap-
per. When they finally meet at night in a park, the kidnapper knocks Harry down 
with his gun and tells him that he will let the girl die anyway. He also tells Harry 
that he wants him to know that before he kills him too. In the moment he is about 
to shoot Harry, who lies defenceless and badly beaten to his feet, Harry’s partner 
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interferes (and is shot). The kidnapper can escape, wounded. Harry pursues him. 
Finally he corners him, and the kidnapper raises his arms to surrender. Harry 
shoots him in the leg. The kidnapper is frightened to death, tells Harry not to kill 
him and that he has rights. Harry asks him where the girl is. The kidnapper talks 
only about his rights. Harry sees the kidnapper’s leg wound and puts his foot on 
it, torturing the kidnapper. The camera retreats. In the next scene, the girl is 
saved. 
The Dirty Harry case, it seems to me, is a case of morally justified torture. But 
isn’t the kidnapper right? Does not even he have rights? Yes, he has, but in these 
circumstances he does not have the right not to be tortured. Again, the situation 
is analogous to self-defence. The aggressor does not lose all of his rights, but his 
right to life weighs less than the innocent defender’s right to life. The aggressor 
culpably brings about a situation where one of the two – he or the defender – will 
die. It is only just and fair that the harm that will befall in this situation upon one 
of the two is diverted to the person who is responsible for the harm – the aggres-
sor. In the Dirty Harry case, the kidnapper brings about a situation where a per-
son is tortured or will continue to be tortured until death (being slowly suffocated 
in a small hole is torture). It is only just and fair that this harm befalls the person 
responsible for the situation – the kidnapper. Moreover, the choice is made even 
easier by the fact that being tortured for a small period of time is better than be-
ing tortured until death. Harry made the right decision.  
Two replies might be made at this point. The first one – repeated like a litany 
by certain opponents of torture – is that interrogative torture simply does not 
work. That, however, is simply wrong. Sometimes interrogative torture does 
work, and the torturer gets the information he was looking for.17 
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Well, one might say, but at least interrogative torture it is not very reliable. 
Apart from the fact that even that is not so clear, it would not even help. Con-
sider the following case: An innocent person is being attacked by an aggressor, 
who fires a deadly weapon at him (and misses him at first but keeps firing). The 
attacked person’s only possibility to save his life is by using the One-Million-
Pains-To-One-Kill-Gun that he happens to have with him. On average, you have 
to pull the trigger of this gun one million times in order to have one immediately 
incapacitating projectile coming out of it (it incapacitates through the infliction 
of unbearable pain). All the other times it fires projectiles that only ten seconds 
after hitting a human target cause the target unbearable pain. Thus, firing this 
gun at the aggressor will certainly cause the aggressor unbearable pain, but the 
probability that it will save the life of the defender is only 1:1,000,000. I must 
admit that I cannot even begin to make sense of the suggestion that, given these 
odds, the defender should not use the gun against the aggressor. Yes, the pain 
inflicted by the weapon on the aggressor is extremely unlikely to secure the sur-
vival of the defender, but there still is a chance that it will, so why should the 
defender forgo this chance for the benefit of the aggressor? Obviously, there is 
no reason (at least none that I could see). Again, the application to the torture of 
ticking bomb terrorists and Dirty Harry kidnappers is obvious. 
What is the second reply? Richard H. Weisberg takes issue with the example 
of the ticking bomb case: 
... the hypothetical itself lacks the virtues of intelligence, appropriateness, and especially sophis-
tication. Here, as in The Brothers Karamazov–pace Sandy Levinson–it is the complex rationaliz-
ers who wind up being more naive than those who speak strictly, directly, and simply against 
injustice. “You can’t know whether a person knows where the bomb is,” explains Cole in a re-
cent piece in the Nation, “or even if they’re telling the truth. Because of this, you wind up sanc-
tioning torture in general.”18 
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To begin with, by allowing torture in the ticking bomb case one does not nec-
essarily wind up by sanctioning it in general. Killing (of certain people) is sanc-
tioned in war but not in general. The actual second reply I was referring to, how-
ever, is that you do not know whether you have the right person. (That you do 
not know whether the person speaks the truth is simply the first reply. We have 
already dealt with it.) But what does it mean: “You don’t know”? Does it mean 
you do not know for certain? If not knowing for certain whether you have the 
right person would be sufficient reason not to harm that person, we would not 
only have to abstain from self-defence but also from punishment. You never 
know for certain!  
Take the example of a man who draws a gun in front of a head of state and 
aims at him. The bodyguards simply cannot know (for certain) whether this per-
son wants to shoot, they cannot even know whether it is a real gun. Maybe the 
“attacker” is only a retard with a water pistol. So the bodyguards of the head of 
state (whom we want to assume innocent) should not shoot at such a person who, 
for all they can know, seems to be attacking the person they are to protect? Ac-
tually, if shooting (and probably killing) him is the only way to make sure that he 
is not able to pull the trigger, they should shoot him. 
One might say that this person, even if he does not really want to shoot and 
has no real gun, at least feigns an attack, and this makes him liable to counter-
attack. Whoever credibly feigns an attack on another person cannot later, after 
having suffered from severe countermeasures, complain that he “only” feigned it. 
He shouldn’t have feigned it at all. We can, however, have a comparable situa-
tion with a terrorist. If a person says to other persons that he is going to build a 
powerful bomb to blow up a kindergarten and has the necessary skills and buys 
the necessary chemicals, he had better not, when the security service storms his 
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hideout where he is surrounded by his bomb-making equipment, sneeringly say: 
“You are too late. I have already planted the bomb. It will go off in 12 hours and 
kill hundreds of children.” If he then gets tortured by the security service, which 
wants to find out where the bomb is, he is not, it seems, in a particularly good 
position to complain about that even if he has not planted a bomb.19 Moreover, 
even if a real or supposed terrorist has not made that particularly threatening 
statement, hanging around with the wrong people in the wrong situations can 
also make you liable to attack. Suppose an innocent woman is hunted by a mob. 
Maybe they do not like her skin colour, her ethnic group, her religion or what-
ever. The mob has already killed other people for the same reason. She hides 
with the hand grenade she fortunately has behind a bush. Suddenly one of the 
group sees her, points his finger at her, shouts “There she is”, and the armed 
members of the group raise their guns to shoot at her. Not all members of the 
group have guns. Some are unarmed and shout: “Kill her, kill her!” Others do 
not even shout but sneer, foaming at the mouth (I am not talking about com-
pletely innocent people, who just “happen” to be there for not fault of their own). 
The only way she can save herself is to throw the grenade at the mob, which will 
kill all of them, including the unarmed ones. Is she justified in doing so? I would 
think so. Being a member of certain groups which collectively undertake aggres-
sive acts or intentionally pose a threat to innocent people makes one liable to 
severe countermeasures. Consequently, a member of a terrorist group might be 
liable to torture in the ticking bomb case, even if he does not know were the 
bomb is. 
It helps, by the way, very little to aver at this point that torture is simply not 
compatible with liberalism. David Luban, for example, claims that torture aims 
“to strip away from its victim all the qualities of human dignity that liberalism 
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prizes” and that “torture is a microcosm, raised to the highest level of intensity, 
of the tyrannical political relationships that liberalism hates the most.”20 How-
ever, prisons are also “microcosms” of tyranny; yet, most liberals do not find 
them incompatible with liberalism. Where is the difference? Maybe it lies in the 
fact that in torture tyranny is “raised to the highest level”. But, first, it is far from 
clear that one hour of torture is more tyrannical than 15 years of prison. Second, 
even if torture were more tyrannical than prison, and liberalism abhorred tyranny, 
there remained still the fact that liberalism can accommodate quite intense forms 
of tyranny, such as incarceration for life (or for a decade and more). Why should 
it not also be able to accommodate the most extreme form of tyranny? “Because 
it is the most extreme form” is in itself no answer to this question. 
More importantly, liberalism is not so much about “dignity” – which is a quite 
elusive concept, anyway (in particular, I deny that the dignity of the culpable 
aggressor is violated by Dirty Harry’s action any more than it would be violated 
by Dirty Harry’s killing him in self-defence) – but about liberty. It is called lib-
eralism, not dignism. It is also not about anybody’s liberty. It is about the liberty 
of the innocent. This is why there is no particular problem in liberalism to kill 
aggressors or to deprive them of their liberty if this is the only way to protect 
innocent people from these aggressors. The core value of the liberal state is the 
protection of the liberty and the rights of innocent individuals against aggressors. 
The state can be such an aggressor, but the state can and must also protect 
against other aggressors. To keep Dirty Harry in the situation described from 
torturing the kidnapper, therefore, would run against the liberal state’s own rai-
son d’être. The state would help the aggressor, not the victim, it would help the 
aggressor’s tyranny over the innocent and therefore actually abet the relationship 
it hates the most.  
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Since my description of the core value of liberalism, as I submit, is at least as 
plausible as Luban’s (and I think it is historically much more plausible), the ap-
peal to liberalism cannot help absolute opponents of torture. To claim that liber-
alism “correctly understood” absolutely prohibits torture simply engages in an 
attempt of persuasive definition and begs the question. Besides, why could liber-
alism, “correctly understood”, not be wrong? 
But – speaking about the innocent – what about the risk of torturing a com-
pletely innocent person, a person that made itself not liable? Yes, that risk exists. 
As it does in the case of punishment. In the latter case, the risk of punishing in-
nocent persons has to be weighed against the risk of not at all punishing the non-
innocent and of not at all deterring potential criminals. In the case of interroga-
tive torture in the context of a ticking bomb situation, the risk of torturing an 
innocent person has to be weighed against the risk of letting other innocent per-
sons die in an explosion. If the weighing process in the former case can justify 
punishment, it is unclear why the weighing process in the latter case could not 
sometimes justify torture. If the odds are high enough, it does. In fact, the justifi-
cation in the latter case might even be easier – easier at least than justifying capi-
tal punishment, for death, as already noted, is worse than torture (at least for 
most people who are confronted with a decision between their death and being 
tortured for a limited time). It might even be easier than justifying incarceration 
for one or two decades, for it is not clear that many persons would not prefer 
some hours or even days of torture to that alternative. 
To sum up the discussion so far: A compelling argument for an absolute 
moral prohibition of torture cannot be made. Under certain circumstances torture 
can be justified. Justified, not only excused. I emphasise this because some phi-
losophers claim that situations of so-called necessity or emergency can only ex-
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cuse torture (and some other extreme measures). But there is nothing in the 
meaning of the terms “necessity” or “emergency” themselves that could warrant 
that view. For example, the German penal code distinguishes between “justifying 
emergency” and “excusing emergency”. §34 reads:  
Whosoever, in order to avert a not otherwise avoidable present danger to life, body, freedom, 
honour, property, or another legally protected interest, acts so as to avert the danger to himself or 
others, does not act illegally if, upon consideration of the conflicting interests, namely of the 
threatened legally protected interests and of the degree of the threatened danger, the protected 
interest substantially outweighs the infringed interest. This, however, is true only if the act is an 
adequate [in the sense of means-end rationality (“angemessen”)] means to avert the danger.21 
He does not act illegally, and that means his act is legally justified. If the pro-
tected interests do not substantially outweigh the infringed interest, however, he 
can at best be excused (§ 35). The moral case is not different. There can be situa-
tions where torture is an instrumentally adequate and the only means to avert a 
certain danger from certain morally protected interests and where the protected 
interests substantially outweigh the infringed ones. Therefore, if the odds are 
high enough, torture can be not only excused but morally justified. 
No doubt, an absolutist opponent of torture will not be particularly impressed 
by the argument offered so far. In fact, absolutists normally (although perhaps 
not always) do not even try to refute the arguments adduced against their abso-
lutist positions; they tend to just persistently and dramatically reaffirm their posi-
tions. The writer and poet Ariel Dorfman is a good example: 
I can only pray that humanity will have the courage to say no, no to torture, no to torture under 
any circumstance whatsoever, no to torture, no matter who the enemy, what the accusation, what 
sort of fear we harbor; no to torture no matter what kind of threat is posed to our safety; no to 
torture anytime, anywhere; no to torture anyone; no to torture.22 
Moral absolutism is a dangerous and mistaken view. If, for example, humanity 
would face the choice (maybe posed by some maniac with the ultimate weapon 
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or by an alien race, or what have you) between being exterminated or torturing 
one particularly bad man (let us say Idi Amin) for an hour or a day, it is far from 
clear why any person in his right mind – both intellectually and morally – should 
pray that humanity said “no to torture”.23 And what, by the way, if the choice is 
between all human beings (that includes children) being tortured by the alien 
race or only one particularly bad man being tortured by some humans? Conse-
quences count; they cannot simply be ignored for the benefit of some allegedly 
absolute rule, especially if they might be catastrophic. Fiat justitia, pereat mun-
dus is an irrational and immoral maxim. 
 
To say it again: A compelling argument for an absolute moral prohibition of tor-
ture cannot be made. But what about the legal prohibition of torture? If torture 
can be morally justified under certain circumstances, should it also be legalised? 
It could seem that torture is already legal under the German penal code. For if, 
as I claimed, the interests which are protected by torturing a terrorist can sub-
stantially outweigh the infringed interests (most notably of the terrorist), then 
torture must be legal. However, the fact that this outweighing can occur from a 
moral perspective does not yet mean that it can also occur from the legal per-
spective of a certain penal code. Each system of laws is in principle free to stipu-
late an absolute prohibition of torture. The German law does this in so far as it 
accepts certain international absolute prohibitions of torture as binding. That is, 
according to German law nothing can (legally) outweigh the interest of not being 
tortured (or at least of not being tortured by state officials or agents acting on 
behalf of a state). That torture is illegal under all circumstances in a given system 
of law, however, does not exclude the possibility that the practice might under 
some circumstances be excused by the law. It seems to me that it would be rea-
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sonable to excuse it under some circumstances.24 I shall, however, say nothing 
further on this topic here. 
Instead, I shall say something about the proposal to justify torture before the 
act (rather than excusing it ex post). The lawyer Alan Dershowitz made the in-
famous suggestion to introduce legal “torture warrants”, issued by judges. 
... it is important to ask the following question: if torture is being or will be practiced, is it worse 
to close our eyes to it and tolerate its use by low-level law enforcement officials without account-
ability, or instead to bring it to the surface by requiring that a warrant of some kind be required as 
a precondition to the infliction of any type of torture under any circumstances?25 
And he states: 
My own belief is that a warrant requirement, if properly enforced, would probably reduce the 
frequency, severity, and duration of torture. I cannot see how it could possibly increase it, since a 
warrant requirement simply imposes an additional level of prior review. ... here are two examples 
to demonstrate why I think there would be less torture with a warrant requirement than without 
one. Recall the case of the alleged national security wiretap being placed on the phones of Martin 
Luther King by the Kennedy administration in the early 1960s. This was in the days when the 
attorney general could authorize a national security wiretap without a warrant. Today no judge 
would issue a warrant in a case as flimsy as that one. When Zaccarias Moussaui was detained 
after trying to learn how to fly an airplane, without wanting to know much about landing it, the 
government did not even seek a national security wiretap because its lawyers believed that a 
judge would not have granted one.26 
A few things must be said concerning this argument. First, closing one’s eyes 
to the practice of torture is not the only alternative to the introduction of torture 
warrants. Unfortunately, Dershowitz seems to have difficulties grasping the dif-
ference between closing one’s eyes on the one hand and exposing and condemn-
ing on the other. To wit, he criticises William Schulz, the executive director of 
Amnesty International USA, who asks whether Dershowitz would also favour 
brutality warrants and prisoner rape warrants. (Dershowitz answers with a “heu-
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ristic yes”, whatever that is supposed to be.)27 And he quotes himself saying: 
“My question back to Schulz is do you prefer the current situation in which bru-
tality, testilying and prisoner rape are rampant, but we close our eyes to these 
evils?”28 Who is “we”? Certainly not Schulz or AI.29 
Second, Dershowitz admits that he “certainly cannot prove ... that a formal 
requirement of a judicial warrant as prerequisite to nonlethal torture would de-
crease the amount of physical violence directed against suspects”.30 It seems, 
however, that Dershowitz should offer something more than his personal “belief” 
and two examples to back the quite grave proposal to legalise torture. That he 
does not displays a lightness about the matter which is out of place. To be sure, 
he also adduces John H. Langbein’s historical study of torture,31 and although he 
concedes that it “does not definitely answer” “whether there would be less tor-
ture if it were done as part of the legal system”, he thinks that it “does provide 
some suggestive insights”. 32  Yet, before drawing “suggestive insights” from 
Langbein’s study and from history, one should get both straight. Dershowitz 
does not.33 In fact, Langbein leaves no doubt that torture was not part of the ju-
dicial system in England. Not only “law enforcement officers” but also the courts 
(and judges) could not warrant torture. Langbein even states: 
The legal basis, such as it was, for the use of torture in the eighty-one known cases appears to 
have been the notion of sovereign immunity, a defensive doctrine that spared the authorities from 
having to supply justification for what they were doing.34 
The facts, then, are that torture was never part of the English judicial system (if it 
was ever legal in England at all) whereas it was part of the Continental legal sys-
tem. Extensive (not to say epidemic) use was made of torture on the Continent 
but not in England. Obviously, these facts suggest insights quite different from 
the ones Dershowitz comes up with.  
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 Moreover, it is also funny that Dershowitz thinks that his two examples sup-
port his case. What his examples show (if they show anything) is that an attorney 
general who is authorised to put a wiretap without judicial warrant is more likely 
to put a wiretap than an attorney general who does need a warrant. However, the 
question to be answered is whether torture would be less likely under a require-
ment of a judicial warrant than under a total ban. To suggest a positive answer to 
this question by way of an analogy, Dershowitz would have to compare a legal 
arrangement in which the attorney general is prohibited from putting a wiretap 
with a legal arrangement where he is authorised to do so if he has a warrant. Der-
showitz does not do that. It is he who engages in “tortured reasoning”, to use his 
term,35 not his critics. 
Finally, why shouldn’t state agents who do not get a warrant torture anyway? 
They do not get a warrant today, and some of them torture anyway. Dershowitz 
answers that 
the current excuse being offered–we had to do what we did to get information–would no longer 
be available, since there would be an authorized method of securing information in extraordinary 
cases by the use of extraordinary means.36 
First, people who escape detection are not in need of excuses to wriggle out of 
punishment in the first place. Besides, the excuse would be available. It would be: 
“Since the judge didn’t give us the warrant – he did not realise the seriousness of 
the situation (or there wasn’t enough time) – we just had to torture under these 
circumstances without a warrant in order to get the information and to avoid a 
great evil.” 
In short, Dershowitz has not offered the slightest bit of evidence – not even 
anecdotal – for his bold claim that the introduction of torture warrants would 
reduce torture or as much as increase accountability. Yet there is very good evi-
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dence to the contrary. Since Dershowitz invited us to draw suggestive insights 
from history, especially on the basis of Langbein’s study, it might be worthwhile 
to note what Langbein himself has to say: 
Another insight from history is the danger that, once legitimated, torture could develop a con-
stituency with a vested interest in perpetuating it.37 
And that, to draw the conclusion Dershowitz isn’t able to draw, would hardly 
help to reduce torture or to increase accountability.  
But why should we try to reduce torture? After all, in the first part of this pa-
per I have argued that no compelling argument for an absolute moral prohibition 
of torture can be made; yes, not even for a prohibition in the Dirty Harry cases. I 
have also argued that torture is not worse than death and probably not worse than 
a decade of incarceration. So since we have legal incarceration, why shouldn’t 
we have legal torture too?  
One very straightforward answer is: because we don’t need it. The ticking 
bomb case or the Dirty Harry case is a very rare case. In fact, it is safe to assume 
that all the torture that happened or happens in Abu Ghraib, Afghanistan and 
Guantanamo simply has nothing to do with ticking bombs or hostages who are 
about to die. The same holds for the overwhelming majority of all other cases of 
torture. Ticking bomb and Dirty Harry cases are exceptions. An emergency or 
necessity paragraph along the lines of § 35 of the German penal code can deal 
with such exceptions, and perhaps not even that is needed. If the stakes are high 
enough and no other option is available, police officers or other state agents will 
probably use torture even if they face prosecution if caught (that is, incidentally, 
what Dershowitz himself claims). Besides, if punished, they might still be al-
lowed the benefit of mitigating circumstances. 
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Second, that being tortured (or torturing someone) is not necessarily worse 
than being killed or incarcerated for a long time (or than killing someone or in-
carcerating him for a long time) does not imply that introducing a wider practice 
of torture is not worse than introducing or maintaining a wider practice of incar-
ceration or killing. Dershowitz, for example, acknowledges: 
Experience has shown that if torture, which has been deemed illegitimate by the civilized world 
for more than a century, were now to be legitimated–even for limited use in one extraordinary 
type of situation–such legitimation would constitute an important symbolic setback in the world-
wide campaign against human rights abuses.38 
However, he thinks: 
It does not necessarily follow from this understandable fear of the slippery slope that we can 
never consider the use of nonlethal infliction of pain, if its use were to be limited by acceptable 
principles of morality. After all, imprisoning a witness who refuses to testify after being given 
immunity is designed to be punitive–that is painful. Such imprisonment can, on occasion, pro-
duce more pain and greater risk of death than nonlethal torture.39 
It does indeed not follow that we can never consider the use of non-lethal inflic-
tion of pain, but it does follow that institutionalising torture – for example with 
torture warrants – is a bad idea. In particular, the analogy with the practice of 
coercing witnesses through imprisonment into testifying is misleading. The prac-
tice is designed to be punitive, yes, but that is not the same as being designed to 
be painful. Not every aversive treatment causes pain. It is important not to blur 
the distinctions. Further, the very fact that imprisonment produces only on occa-
sion more pain and greater risk of death than non-lethal torture (although I sup-
pose that non-lethal imprisonment would carry no risk of death) shows that it is 
not designed to produce pain and death. After all, being released can, on occa-
sion, also produce more pain and greater risk of death than non-lethal torture. 
But how is that supposed to support the case for torture or for torture warrants? 
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Thus, by using imprisonment as a method of punishment we are not already on 
the slippery slope. 
Even if legalising torture puts us on a slippery slope, couldn’t we stop the 
slide downwards? Dershowitz proposes a “principled break”: 
For example, if nonlethal torture were legally limited to convicted terrorists who had knowledge 
of future massive terrorist acts, were given immunity, and still refused to provide the information, 
there might still be objections to the use of torture, but they would have to go beyond the slippery 
slope argument.40 
Actually, one argument that could be made here is that a convicted terrorist 
will hardly be a ticking bomb terrorist, unless, of course, he has set the time fuse 
on a few months or even years or his conviction was made without due process. 
Giving up due process, however, does not look very much like a “principled 
break”, at least if the principle is supposed to be compatible with the rule of law. 
That notwithstanding, it has to be admitted that “massive terrorist acts” will have 
to be planned long enough in advance so that a convicted terrorist might have 
knowledge of them. Consequently, torturing him might be a means to thwart the 
attacks.   
However, Dershowitz’s talk about a “principled break” does, in fact, not ad-
dress the problem of an “important symbolic setback in the world-wide cam-
paign against human rights abuses” at all. The symbolic setback consists pre-
cisely in undermining the absolute prohibition on torture and cannot be compen-
sated, probably not even mitigated, by recourse to alleged “principled breaks”. 
Moreover, the whole idea of a “principled break” in connection with “security 
laws” that cut down on civil liberties and individual rights is rather naive. (I put 
“security laws” in quotation marks because cutting down on civil liberties and 
individual rights hardly increases an individual’s security from the state – the 
political entity, it should be remembered, that has slaughtered more people than 
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any other political entity in history and is certainly more dangerous than any sub-
national terrorist organisation.) Experience shows that measures introduced 
against putative terrorists in alleged conditions of emergency tend to be doubly 
extended, namely, beyond the emergency and to crimes or offences of lesser se-
riousness. In the UK, for example, emergency anti-terrorist measures, such as 
limitations on the right to silence, admissibility of confession evidence and ex-
tended periods of pre-judicial detention, have infiltrated ordinary criminal law 
and procedure.41 Once advertised as being targeted only against terrorists, they 
can now befall any citizen who gets involved in criminal procedure. 
It is to be expected, then, that the legalisation of torture for certain specific 
circumstances will, just like other so-called security laws, come with an inherent 
“metastatic tendency” 42  that in time extends it beyond those circumstances. 
Apart from this dangerous tendency of “security laws” in general there is, in ad-
dition, something very special about torture. Jeremy Waldron has argued that the 
prohibition of torture is archetypical of the idea 
that even where law has to operate forcefully, there will not be the connection that has existed in 
other times or places between law and brutality. People may fear and be deterred by legal sanc-
tions... they may even on occasion be literally forced ... to do things or go places they would not 
otherwise do or go to. But even when this happens, they will not be herded like cattle or broken 
like horses; they will not be beaten like dumb animals or treated just as bodies to be manipulated. 
Instead, there will be an enduring connection between the spirit of law and respect for human 
dignity – respect for human dignity even in extremis, even in situations where law is at its most 
forceful and its subjects at their most vulnerable.43 
That the prohibition of torture is a legal archetype means that it “has a signifi-
cance stemming from the fact that it sums up or makes vivid to us the point, pur-
pose, principle or policy of a whole area of law”.44 For example, Waldron shows 
that decisive court rulings against lesser forms of police brutality – lesser, that is, 
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than torture – were made with reference to torture. The similarities with torture 
were invoked to reject those other brutalities. This, of course, would not be pos-
sible if torture itself became regularised and justified by law, for the similarity 
with a regular legal practice could hardly count against some other practice. As 
Waldron puts it: 
The idea is that our confidence that what lies at the bottom of the slope (torture) is wrong informs 
and supports our confidence that the lesser evils that lie above torture are wrong too.45 
Thus, by undermining the archetype of the prohibition of torture one also under-
mines the prohibition of lesser forms of brutality. The whole set of injunctions 
against brutality would unravel and the character of the legal system would be 
corrupted.46 
What is so frightening about such a brutalisation of the legal system is that it 
is also the brutalisation of its enforcer – which, in modern societies, is ultimately 
the state. It is one thing to grant to an individual in a certain situation the moral 
justification to torture another individual; it is a completely different thing to 
allow the state to legally institutionalise torture in certain circumstances. Dirty 
Harry has to justify himself not only morally but also legally. He might face le-
gal charges, and that might make him think twice before he tortures someone. 
This, in fact, ensures that the slope of the moral permission of torture in certain 
cases does not become too slippery to be acceptable. Dirty Harry takes his deci-
sion as an individual, not as an agent of the state. The state is not behind him. 
But if law enforcers can resort to torture knowing in advance that the state is 
behind them, the worst has to be expected – on a large and inevitably growing 
scale. Here it is worth noting that the argument that the prohibition of torture is 
an archetype and the argument that the legal introduction of torture would have a 





tends, the more it will undermine the archetypical character of the prohibition; 
the more that happens, the further the practice will extend. It is not only a slip-
pery slope but also a slope that on its way down gets exponentially steeper. One 
of the functions of the rule of law is to keep the power of the state under control. 
But this doesn’t work with any law. It doesn’t work with a brutal or brutalised 
one. Torture warrants are indeed a “stunningly bad idea”.47 
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